Arms conversion, broadly defined as the transfer of resources from military to civil use, has a long historical pedigree dating back to biblical times. Turning swords into plowshares remains one of our most evocative images of peace, reflecting the universal desire to bring an end to war and to use skills for productive rather than destructive purposes.
But, in terms of popular perception, perhaps the most important experience is World War Two with its massive and rapid restructuring of the economy and by which contemporary policies for conversion are still judged. Rather than the feared recession, both the UK and the USA successfully demobilised millions of armed forces personnel and transferred millions of workers from military to civil production. By the end of 1946, and despite the ongoing problems of rationing, raw material shortages, etc, the economy was functioning at near full employment.
Such a profound transition is not required in today’s circumstances. Although arms production is important in particular niches of manufacturing, it is marginal to the national economy in terms of output and employment. Should there be an unfortunate and unintentional outbreak of peace, the impact of job losses would be relatively short-lived, and focused on only a few localised concentrations of arms employment such as Barrow-in-Furness, in Cumbria.
Despite the context now being radically different, the war experience continues to dominate our view of how conversion should operate. Then, companies temporarily involved in arms production simply brought their tools and equipment out from storage and returned to civil work. Also, during the war, considerable savings had built up that found a ready outlet in consumer spending. So rather than conversion, this was essentially reconversion at a time of high demand for civil goods.
That unique combination of factors no longer applies and the further away we get, the less relevant World War Two becomes for conversion policy. From the onset of the Cold War in the early 1950s, we have seen the emergence of a permanent military-industrial complex and highly specialised arms corporations in aerospace, shipbuilding, engineering and electronics to satisfy the byzantine demands of the MoD.
Any attempt to restructure existing arms production faces massive technical, institutional and cultural barriers because of what could best be described as redundant military complexity required to provide interoperability of systems under extreme condition of performance and in ways that have no equivalent in the civil sector. Even with public investment to support the process, any successful outcomes would be highly problematic. Furthermore, the sectors in which the specialist arms corporations might be expected to look for similar work, eg, civil aircraft, communication satellites, cruise ships, etc, already have mature civil markets served by companies that operate with a distinct set of advantages over any arms company attempting to develop products for those markets.
Put simply, the traditional approach of swords into plowshares no longer applies. Retention of the model seems more driven by the motivation of the peace movement to reassure certain sectional interests in the trade unions that disarmament can be achieved relatively painlessly and without the loss of any employment in the arms industries.
This rather begs the question of what is so special about this form of structural adjustment compared to others. Steel, coal, textiles etc, have seen far greater job losses and serious dislocation for local communities but without this consideration. Instead, a range of policies have been brought into play to help localities diversify their employment base and reduce dependency on any one particular sector, albeit with varying degrees of success.
Nor is there any real enthusiasm and support for conversion in the trade unions, despite the occasional resolution at national conferences in favour. Instead, they have been some of the most effective lobbyists within the military-industrial complex, arguing for the retention of jobs in the arms sector and promoting all the various military white elephants like the aircraft carriers, the new Astute nuclear submarine and, of course, Trident.
That is not to say conversion doesn’t have a role to play. Recent interest has focused on renewable energy and larger-scale engineering projects like wind turbines and associated gearing systems, etc, that could take up capacity presently used for arms production. But again, the question must be raised as to why arms corporations deserve special attention given these major structural barriers. Unfortunately, the issue tends to be glossed over in order to reassure sectional interests that conversion can be a smooth technical process maintaining employment on site.
Rather than a failed and potentially costly model, the focus should be on how government can signal fundamental changes in the economy through its own research and development and procurement priorities. Conversion then could be seen both as an investment function and as part of a new security paradigm, releasing scarce resources for new industries that will provide both employment and guaranteed, indigenous sources of energy supply.
Despite some growth in the support for renewables during the final years of the New Labour administration, the UK still represents one of the worst European performers in terms of the gap between the potential to generate electricity from renewable sources and actual production. A government investment pool of £40-50 billion from cuts to military spending over a five year period would be a substantial contribution in itself, and as a stimulus to further investment by companies with a commitment to the range of renewables manufacturing and support services in the UK.
As to the big arms production and research and development facilities, the priority should be a speedy closure and dismantlement. This would include the shipyards in Barrow and Glasgow, the aircraft manufacturing around Preston, the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston and the Devenport dockyard, with only a residual public investment for care and maintenance and decommissioning. Where those sites can be used for alternative activities, the land should be released as soon as possible and a range of policies for diversifying local economies put in place. But there should be no special consideration over and above what would normally be put in place for mainstream, local regeneration programmes.
Some localised job losses are unavoidable, but assuming that macro-economic policies are in place to support these new industries, overall manufacturing employment will increase and those areas should be in a position to attract their share of work.
Steven Schofield
January 2011.
